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Abstract

In the last few years, associations of domestic
retailers have become vociferous opponents of Amazon’s
practices in India. In response to complaints of anti-competitive
conduct, the Competition Commission of India has initiated an
investigation into Amazon’s anti-competitive vertical agreements
in online smartphone retail. Against this backdrop, Reuters
published a series of investigative reports which indicate that
Amazon used internal data of third-party sellers and engaged
in preferential treatment of private labels and preferred sellers.
The Reuters reports join a series of other reports and studies
which reveal that such conduct is pervasive across product
categories. In light of this information, this paper makes two
broad arguments. First, the paper argues that the scope of the
competition investigation in India should be broadened beyond
smartphones. The investigation should be reoriented to focus
on the relationship between Amazon and its preferred sellers or
retailers more broadly, rather than bifurcating the investigation
along the lines of separate product categories. Second, the paper
argues that the publicly-available information is sufficient to
satisfy the legal test for passing an interim order. Such an interim
order should prohibit Amazon from acting in the dual capacity
of marketplace and seller. The necessity of the interim order has
been highlighted through reference to the potentially irreparable
and unquantifiable harm done to competition and consumers
and the protracted nature of competition proceedings which
might render the final order redundant.
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I. I ntroduction
Even as the world wraps its head around the Wall Street Journal exposé
of Facebook1 and attempts to understand the implications of the Facebook
papers, 2 there have been yet other journalistic investigations of a Big Tech
company’s internal documents and practices which once again reveal legally
and ethically dubious conduct. In 2021 Reuters published two special reports
based on thousands of pages of Amazon’s internal documents which show
that, at least in India, Amazon has been copying retailers’ products and
favoring private labels on its e-commerce platform as part of its formal strategy and that even high-level executives of the company were aware of these
actions.3 Although this exposé of Amazon’s practices has attracted only a
fraction of the public attention in comparison to the Facebook Papers, the
investigation and evidence unearthed against Amazon are legally significant
in multiple ways, especially in India, as most of these documents apparently
pertain to the company’s practices in India.
1

2

3

‘The Facebook Files: A Wall Street Journal Investigation’ The Wall Street Journal <https://
www.wsj.com/articles/the-facebook-files-11631713039> accessed 6 December 2021.
Andrew Marantz, ‘The Meta Narrative: What we’ve Learned from the Facebook Papers’ the
New Yorker (5 November 2021) <https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/themeta-narrative-what-weve-learned-from-the-facebook-papers> accessed 6 December 2021;
Bill Chappell, ‘The Facebook Papers: What you need to Know about the Trove of Insider
Documents’ NPR (25 October 2021) <https://www.npr.org/2021/10/25/1049015366/thefacebook-papers-what-you-need-to-know> accessed 6 December 2021.
Aditya Kalra, Test the Boundaries: Amazon Documents Reveal Company’s Secret Strategy
to Dodge Indian Regulators, Reuters (17 February 2021) <https://www.reuters.com/
investigates/special-report/amazon-india-operation/> accessed 6 December 2021; Aditya
Kalra & Steve Stecklow, ‘The Imitation Game: Amazon Copied Products and Rigged
Search Results to Promote its Own Brands, Documents Show’ Reuters (13 October 2021)
<https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/amazon-india-rigging/> accessed 6
December 2021.
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For a long time now, retailers in India have cried foul over Amazon’s
conduct claiming that it engages in several anti-competitive practices which
disadvantage third-party sellers on its platform resulting in an uneven playing field and eventual elimination of retailers from the market. Associations
of retailers and Small and Medium enterprises have raised these concerns
before the Ministry of Commerce and Industry,4 the Reserve Bank of India, 5
the Enforcement Directorate6 and the Competition Commission of India.7
Additionally, retailers have also resorted to other means of expressing their
grievances including organizing a protest during Jeff Bezos’ visit to India,8
launching a call for a boycott of Amazon during the festival sale season,9
requesting Indian tech moguls to discontinue their ties with Amazon and
stop acting as a front for its private labels,10 and attempting to characterize Amazon as the modern ‘English East India Company.’11 In the shape
of the collective of Indian retailers, Amazon might have found its match,
because even though these entities may not be comparable to the global
tech behemoth in terms of size and access to funds, they certainly have the
political clout and sway to influence the government and lobby regulators

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

‘Complaints against E-commerce Players being Looked into: Govt’ Financial Express (31
July 2021) <https://www.financialexpress.com/industry/complaints-against-e-commerceplayers-being-looked-into-govt/2301262/> accessed 6 December 2021.
‘Centre Directs ED, RBI to Act against Amazon, Flipkart for FDI, FEMA Violations’
The Times of India (31 December 2020) <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/
india-business/centre-directs-ed-rbi-to-act-against-amazon-flipkart-for-fdi-fema-violations/articleshow/80043646.cms> accessed 6 December 2021.
‘ED Initiates Probe against Amazon Over ‘Violation’ of Foreign Exchange Law’ The Print
(28 January 2021) <https://theprint.in/india/ed-initiates-probe-against-amazon-over-violation-of-foreign-exchange-law/594109/> accessed 6 December 2021.
Delhi Vyapar Mahasangh v Flipkart Internet (P) Ltd 2020 SCC OnLine CCI 3 (India);
Lifestyle Equities CV v Amazon Seller Services (P) Ltd 2020 SCC OnLine CCI 33
(India); ‘Prepare, Present Complaints against Big Online Retailers before CCI: Goyal’
Business Standard (9 August 2020) <https://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/prepare-present-complaints-against-big-online-retailers-before-cci-goyal-121080901885_1.html> accessed 6 December 2021.
Soutik Biswas, ‘Why India is Greeting Amazon’s Jeff Bezos with Protests’ British
Broadcasting Corporation (15 January 2020) <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-51117315> accessed 6 December 2021.
‘Traders, Online Sellers Protest against E-commerce Brands’ The Economic Times (2
November 2021) <https://retail.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/industry/traders-online-sellers-protest-against-e-commerce-brands/87477436> accessed 6 December 2021.
‘Indian Sellers Collective asks Narayana Murthy to end ties with Amazon’ Business
Standard (19 July 2021) <https://www.business-standard.com/article/companies/indian-sellers-collective-asks-narayana-murthy-to-end-ties-with-amazon-121071900531_1.
html> accessed 6 December 2021.
PTI, ‘RSS – Linked Weekly Terms Amazon as ‘East India Company 2.0’ The Indian
Express (26 September 2021) <https://indianexpress.com/article/india/rss-linked-weeklyamazon-as-east-india-company-7536066/> accessed 6 December 2021.
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into taking action and getting their voices heard.12 Unsurprisingly, therefore Indian retailers have managed to convince several government agencies,
including the Enforcement Directorate and the Competition Commission
of India, to investigate Amazon’s practices in India. Given the high stakes
involved, namely, greater control of one of the biggest digital retail markets
in the world,13 the altercation between independent retailers and Amazon is
expected to be intense and long-drawn.
In this backdrop this article looks at some of the journalistic reports and
studies, especially the Reuters reports on Amazon’s conduct in India, to argue
that in light of all the information that is publicly available, the Competition
Commission of India (“Commission” or “CCI”) should: (i) expand and reorient the scope of its competition investigation into Amazon; and (ii) pass an
interim order prohibiting Amazon from operating in the dual capacity of a
marketplace and a seller.

II. Competition Cases Against A mazon

in

I ndia

One of the primary regulators which is currently assessing the legality of
Amazon’s conduct is the CCI. The allegations against Amazon before the
CCI have taken the form of two cases that have culminated in very different
outcomes.
In Delhi Vyapar Mahasangh v Flipkart Internet (P) Ltd & Amazon14 an
association of Small and Medium Enterprises brought a complaint against
the two biggest e-commerce platforms in India, Amazon and Flipkart,
alleging that both platforms entered into several vertical agreements with
their preferred sellers, that is, sellers who are directly or indirectly affiliated or controlled by these e-commerce platforms. It was alleged that both
12

13

14

Anuj Srivas, ‘Amazon’s Jeff Bezos is in India, But he is not Exactly Getting a Welcome
Wagon’ The Wire (15 January 2020) <https://thewire.in/business/amazon-jeff-bezos-india-welcome-wagon> accessed 6 December 2021.
‘Value e-commerce in India to grow to $40 Billion by 2030: Kearney’ Livemint (17 August
2021)
<https://www.livemint.com/economy/value-e-commerce-in-india-to-grow-to-40billion-by-2030-kearney-11629176945549.html> accessed 6 December 2021; ‘Indian
E-retail Market Expected to Grow to $140 Bn by FY26: Bain & Company’ Business Standard
(17 August 2021) <https://www.business-standard.com/article/companies/indian-e-retail-market-expected-to-grow-to-140-bn-by-fy26-bain-company-121081700144_1.html>
accessed 6 December 2021; ‘India’s Consumer Digital Economy to Grow 10X to $800
Bn by 2030: Redseer’ Business Standard (1 July 2021) <https://www.business-standard.
com/article/current-affairs/india-s-consumer-digital-economy-to-grow-10x-to-800-bn-by2030-redseer-121063001783_1.html> accessed 6 December 2021.
Delhi Vyapar Mahasangh v Flipkart Internet (P) Ltd 2020 SCC OnLine CCI 3 (India)
(“Delhi Vyapar Mahasangh”).
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e-commerce platforms engaged in deep discounting, preferential listing and
exclusive tie-ups for both preferred sellers as well as their own private labels
which amounted to an abuse of dominance as well as an anti-competitive
agreement under the Competition Act, 2002. Importantly, in Delhi Vyapar
Mahasangh the allegations were limited only to the sale of smartphones on
these platforms and did not cover other product categories. In this case, the
CCI prima facie found merit in the allegations and initiated a detailed investigation. This investigation is still ongoing. It should be noted that Amazon
is being investigated for entering into anti-competitive vertical agreements
(with preferred sellers) in violation of section 3(4) of the Competition Act.15
There is currently no investigation against Amazon for abuse of dominance
under section 4 of the Competition Act.1617
In contrast to Delhi Vyapar Mahasangh, the CCI in Lifestyle Equities v
Amazon refused to initiate an investigation when similar allegations were levelled against Amazon in the category of online fashion retail.18 The different
15

16

17

18

The Competition Act 2002, s 3(4):
Any agreement amongst enterprises or persons at different stages or levels of the production chain in different markets, in respect of production, supply, distribution, storage,
sale or price of, or trade in goods or provision of services, including(a) tie-in arrangement;
(b) exclusive supply agreement;
(c) exclusive distribution agreement;
(d) refusal to deal;
(e) resale price maintenance,
(f) shall be an agreement in contravention of sub-section (1) if such agreement causes or is
likely to cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition in India.
The Competition Act 2002, s 4(2):
There shall be an abuse of dominant position [under sub-section (1), if an enterprise or
a group](a) directly or indirectly, imposes unfair or discriminatory(i) condition in purchase or sale of goods or service; or
(ii) price in purchase or sale (including predatory price) of goods or service.
(b) limits or restricts—
(i) production of goods or provision of services or market therefor; or
(ii) technical or scientific development relating to goods or services to the prejudice of
consumers; or
(c) indulges in practice or practices resulting in denial of market access in any manner; or
(d) makes conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by other parties of supplementary
obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts; or
(e) uses its dominant position in one relevant market to enter into, or protect, other relevant market.
Delhi Vyapar Mahasangh (n 14) [15] (the Commission noted that the Informant had levelled allegations of joint or collective abuse of dominance which is not envisaged under the
Competition Act).
Lifestyle Equities CV v Amazon Seller Services (P) Ltd 2020 SCC OnLine CCI 33
(“Lifestyle Equities”); The order has been appealed before the National Company Law
Appellate Tribunal - Competition Appeal (AT)-20/2020.
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outcomes were sought to be justified on the basis of the different market
structures and competitive dynamics in the two markets. Online fashion
retail was considered much more competitive than online smartphone sales
and additionally, there was no evidence of exclusive tie-ups in the former.19
Further, the primary allegation in Lifestyle Equities pertained to counterfeiting and unauthorized selling of products – wrongs which were considered to be outside the scope of competition law. 20 The decision of the CCI
to close the case in Lifestyle Equities has been appealed before the National
Company Law Appellate Tribunal, whose decision is awaited. 21
With these cases, India joins a slew of jurisdictions including the USA, 22
European Union, 23 Germany, 24 France, 25 and Australia, 26 which are attempting to use the antitrust framework to regulate Amazon’s practices. However,
the investigation against Amazon in India unlike most other jurisdictions
is not based on abuse of dominance.27 The fact that Amazon’s conduct is
19
20
21
22

23

24

25

26

27

ibid [30].
ibid [28].
National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, Competition Appeal (AT)-20/2020.
Laurine Feiner & Annie Palmer, ‘DC Attorney General Sues Amazon on Antitrust
Grounds, Alleges it Illegally Raises Prices’ CNBC (25 May 2021) <https://www.cnbc.
com/2021/05/25/dc-attorney-general-sues-amazon-on-antitrust-grounds-alleges-it-illegally-raises-prices.html> accessed 6 December 2022; Annie Palmer & Laurine Feiner,
‘DC Attorney General goes After Amazon’s First-party Business in Amended Antitrust
Complaint’ CNBC (13 September 2021) <https://www.cnbc.com/2021/09/13/dc-attorney-general-targets-amazons-first-party-business-in-amended-antitrust-complaint.html>
accessed 6 December 2021.
‘Antitrust: Commission Opens Investigation into Possible Anti-competitive Conduct
of Amazon’ (European Commission, 17 July 2019) <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/
presscorner/detail/en/ip_19_4291> accessed 6 December 2021; ‘Antitrust: Commission
sends Statement of Objections to Amazon for the use of non-public Independent Seller
Data and Opens Second Investigation into its E-commerce Business Practices’ (European
Commission, 10 November 2020) <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/
en/ip_20_2077> accessed 6 December 2021.
Siladitya Ray, ‘Amazon is being Investigated by Germany’s Antitrust Watchdog for Allegedly
Influencing Third-party Seller Prices During Pandemic’ Forbes (17 August 2020) <https://
www.forbes.com/sites/siladityaray/2020/08/17/amazon-is-being-investigated-by-germanys-antitrust-watchdog-for-allegedly-influencing-third-party-seller-prices-during-pandemic/?sh=7104930a4ad6> accessed 6 December 2021; ‘German Watchdog Launches New
Investigation into Amazon’ Reuters (28 October 2020) <https://www.reuters.com/article/
amazon-com-germany-competition-idUSKBN27D2OQ> accessed 6 December 2021;
‘German Antitrust Watchdog Launches New Proceedings against Amazon’ Reuters (18
May 2021) <https://www.reuters.com/business/retail-consumer/german-antitrust-watchdog-launches-new-proceedings-against-amazon-2021-05-18/> accessed 6 December 2021.
‘France Files Complaint against Amazon for Abuse of Dominant Position’ Reuters (18
December
2017)
<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-amazon-com-france-idUKKBN1EC0QN> accessed 6 December 2021.
‘Australian Regulator to Probe Amazon, eBay and Other Online Markets’ CNBC (21
July
2021)
<https://www.cnbc.com/2021/07/22/australian-regulator-to-probe-amazon-ebay-and-other-online-markets.html> accessed 6 December 2021.
See (n 23-26).
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being investigated using the framework of vertical agreements and not abuse
of dominance is noteworthy since it changes the elements of the violation
which have to be proved and has other potential implications. For instance,
it means that the relevant market for Amazon need not be delineated and
therefore, the competition assessment need not be narrowly focused on certain product categories which form the relevant market. Instead examining potential violation of ‘vertical agreement’ allows the investigation to be
focused broadly on the nature of the relationship between Amazon and its
sellers, not constrained by product categories. This and other peculiarities
of using vertical agreements instead of abuse of dominance framework have
been discussed in greater detail later in this paper.

III. New I nformation and Evidence A bout A mazon’s
P ractices
Amazon has consistently denied many of the allegations levelled against it as
being factually incorrect. Before regulators in India as well as those in other
jurisdictions, Amazon insists that it has access to the same data as all other
sellers on its platform and it does not use internal non-public data of thirdparty sellers. 28 Similarly, Amazon claims that its search results are based on
relevance, reviews and other objective metrics and it does not unfairly favour
private labels or preferred sellers in the search ranking.29 In the backdrop of
these ongoing competition cases and Amazon’s outright denial of the allegations as being factually incorrect, the Reuters’ investigative reports come at a
crucial time. According to Reuters, the internal documents in its possession
reveal, amongst other things, that Amazon, at least in India:
(i) Gave preferential treatment to a few Special Merchants30 or selected
sellers by giving them discounted fees, access to Amazon’s global
retail tools and helping them cut exclusive deals with other big tech
manufacturers.
(ii) Secretly exploited non-public internal seller data (including proprietary data, data relating to business strategies and transactions

28

29
30

Lauren Feiner, ‘Amazon Exec Tells Lawmakers the Company doesn’t Favor Own Brands
Over Products Sold by Third-party Merchants’ CNBC (16 July 2019) <https://www.cnbc.
com/2019/07/16/amazon-tells-house-it-doesnt-favor-own-brands-in-antitrust-hearing.
html> accessed 6 December 2021.
ibid.
Kalra, ‘Test the Boundaries’ (n 3). (Cloudtail and Appario were two of Amazon’s special
merchants).
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– number of units purchased, returned, etc.) to copy successful products, 31 sell them at steep discounts and boost the sales of its private
labels.
(iii) Manipulated search results on the platform to favour the company’s
own products.32
Apart from calling into question the credibility of Amazon’s representations, the reports also indicate how extensive these practices are. Such conduct was observed across several product categories including textile/fashion
retail, smartphones, home furnishings, health and household products.
The Reuters reports come alongside other recent reports and studies in the
Wall Street Journal, 33 the New York Times, 34 the Markup, 35 and the Capitol
Forum, 36 which make similar claims that Amazon uses internal data of sell31

32
33

34

35

36

Whether unauthorized copying and counterfeiting falls within the subject matter domain
of competition law is not a question that this paper seeks to answer. In order to avoid this
question, the competition law concerns against Amazon which this paper seeks to address
are not those of counterfeiting or copying but of use of internal seller data and preferential
treatment.
Kalra, ‘Test the Boundaries’ (n 3); Kalra & Stecklow, ‘The Imitation Game’ (n 3).
Dana Mattioli, ‘Amazon Scooped up Data from its Own Sellers to Launch Competing
Products’ The Wall Street Journal (23 April 2020) <https://www.wsj.com/articles/amazon-scooped-up-data-from-its-own-sellers-to-launch-competing-products-11587650015>
accessed 6 December 2021; Shane Shifflett and others, ‘Amazon’s Choice isn’t the
Endorsement it Appears’ The Wall Street Journal (22 December 2019) <https://www.wsj.
com/articles/amazons-choice-isnt-the-endorsement-it-appears-11577035151#refreshed?mod=article_inline> accessed 6 December 2021; Dana Mattioli, ‘Amazon Changed Search
Algorithm in ways that Boost its Own Products’ The Wall Street Journal (16 September
2019)
<https://www.wsj.com/articles/amazon-changed-search-algorithm-in-ways-thatboost-its-own-products-11568645345> accessed 6 December 2021; cf Dana Mattioli,
‘How Amazon Wins: By Steamrolling Rivals and Partners’ The Wall Street Journal (22
December 2020) <https://www.wsj.com/articles/amazon-competition-shopify-wayfair-allbirds-antitrust-11608235127> accessed 6 December 2021.
Julie Creswell, ‘How Amazon Steers Shoppers to its Own Products’ The New York Times
(23 June 2018) <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/23/business/amazon-the-brandbuster.html> accessed 6 December 2021
Adrianne Jeffries & Leon Yin, ‘Amazon Puts its Own “Brands” First Above Better-rated
Products’ (The Markup, 14 October 2021) <https://themarkup.org/amazons-advantage/2021/10/14/amazon-puts-its-own-brands-first-above-better-rated-products> accessed
6 December 2021; Leon Yin & Adrianne Jeffries, ‘How we Analysed Amazon’s Treatment
of its “Brands” in Search Results’ (The Markup, 14 October 2021) <https://themarkup.
org/amazons-advantage/2021/10/14/how-we-analyzed-amazons-treatment-of-its-brandsin-search-results> accessed 6 December 2021.
‘Amazon: EC Investigation to Focus on whether Amazon uses Data to Develop and
Favor Private Label Products; Former Employees Say Data key to Private Label Strategy’
(The Capitol Forum, 5 November 2018) <https://thecapitolforum.com/wp-content/
uploads/2018/11/Amazon-2018.11.05.pdf> accessed 6 December 2021; ‘Amazon: By
Prioritising its Own Fashion Label Brands in Product Placement on its Increasingly
Dominant Platform, Amazon Risks Antitrust Enforcement by a Trump Administration’
(The Capitol Forum, 13 December 2016) <https://thecapitolforum.com/wp-content/
uploads/2016/07/Amazon-2016.12.13.pdf> accessed 6 December 2021.
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ers and prioritizes its own private labels. These claims are based on numerous
employee testimonials, detailed experiments, studies and extensive internal
documents. For its part, Amazon has simply responded that these reports
are inaccurate and unsubstantiated.37 Further, Amazon has stated that it has
a company policy which prohibits the use of internal seller data to develop
private labels and investigates any allegations of violation of this policy.38
The Reuters reports have already caught the eye of relevant authorities
both in India and abroad. The reports had a series of consequences. The
Enforcement Directorate in India initiated an investigation into Amazon
for potential violations of the foreign direct investment rules.39 The High
Court of Karnataka40 and the Supreme Court of India dismissed Amazon’s
writ petition to halt the competition regulator’s investigation.41 US lawmakers called for the breaking up of Amazon.42 Five members of the US House
Judiciary Committee wrote to Amazon accusing the company’s top executives of lying or misleading the Congress and threatening criminal action.43
A global trade union urged the European Commission to widen its antitrust
investigation of Amazon,44 and the association of Indian digital companies
37

38

39

40

41

42

43
44

‘Amazon India Boss Claims Report on Malpractices is Factually Incorrect’ The Economic
Times (18 February 2021) <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/tech-bytes/
amazon-india-boss-claims-reuters-report-is-factually-incorrect/articleshow/81094015.
cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst> accessed
6 December 2021.
Steve Stecklow and others, ‘Five U.S. Lawmakers Accuse Amazon of Possibly Lying to
Congress Following Reuters Report’ Reuters (19 October 2021) <https://www.reuters.
com/technology/five-us-lawmakers-accuse-amazon-possibly-lying-congress-following-reuters-report-2021-10-18/> accessed 6 December 2021
Aditya Kalra, ‘India’s Enforcement Directorate to Examine Findings in Reuters Report on
Amazon: Agency Source’ Reuters (18 February 2021) <https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-amazon-india-operations-enforcement-idUSKBN2AI1TC> accessed 6 December 2021.
Aditya Kalra, ‘India Antitrust Body says Reuters Story Corroborates Evidence in Probe of
Amazon’ Reuters (19 March 2021) <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-amazon-com-india-idUSKBN2BB1UF> accessed 6 December 2021; Tarush Bhalla, ‘HC Refuses to Halt
CCI Probe against Amazon, Flipkart’ Livemint (23 July 2021) <https://www.livemint.
com/companies/news/karnataka-hc-quashes-amazon-flipkart-s-plea-against-cci-investigation-11627049204076.html> accessed 6 December 2021.
‘Supreme Court Refuses to Halt CCI Probe against Flipkart and Amazon’ The Indian
Express (10 August 2021) <https://indianexpress.com/article/business/companies/
supreme-court-refuses-halt-antitrust-probe-flipkart-amazon-cci-7445413/#:~:text=The%20probe%20ordered%20by%20the,refused%20to%20stay%20the%20investigation> accessed 6 December 2021.
Aditya Kalra & Steve Stecklow, ‘Indian Retailers Want Probe After Report Accuses
Amazon of Rigging’ The Wire (15 October 2021) <https://thewire.in/business/indian-retailers-want-probe-after-report-accuses-amazon-of-rigging> accessed 6 December 2021.
Steve Stecklow and others (n 38).
Aditya Kalra, ‘Labour Union Urges European Authorities to Widen Amazon Antitrust
Probe After Reuters Story’ Reuters (22 October 2021) <https://www.reuters.com/technology/labour-union-urges-european-authorities-widen-amazon-antitrust-probe-after-2021-10-22/> accessed 6 December 2021.
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demanded that the government initiate a probe into the company.45 Quite
apart from these developments, this paper argues that the Reuters and other
recent reports on Amazon’s conduct have important implications for the
ongoing competition investigation and cases against Amazon in India.

IV. Need

to

Broaden the Scope
I nvestigation

of

Competition

As outlined earlier the scope of the competition investigation against Amazon
in India is rather narrow. At present, the investigation is limited only to the
product category of smartphones as directed in Delhi Vyapar Mahasangh.
Even after accounting for Lifestyle Equities in which investigation has not
been directed but which is currently under appeal, only two product categories, namely, smartphone and fashion retail, are covered by the present cases.
The remaining product categories currently do not seem to be on the radar of
the Indian competition regulator. However, as the Reuters’ and other reports
reveal the alleged anti-competitive conduct is observed across multiple product categories (including textile/fashion retail, smartphones, home furnishings, health and household products) and this list seems to be ever-increasing
as Amazon keeps expanding its private labels in new categories.46 Given the
ubiquity of the conduct, it is far from adequate that the competition investigation remains limited to only a few product categories.
Perhaps, one reason why the competition regulator might want to look
at online retail in each product category separately is that the competitive
dynamics and market structure of each category could be distinct. This
was also one of the grounds adopted by the CCI while distinguishing Delhi
Vyapar Mahasangh from Lifestyle Equities and refusing to direct investigation in the latter even though it had been directed in the former. For instance,

45

46

‘Statement: ADIF Condemns Amazon’s Predatory Playbook of Copying, Rigging and
Killing Indian Brands, Urges Government for Timely Intervention’ (Alliance of Digital
India Foundation, 14 October 2021) <https://blog.adif.in/p/adif-amazon-reuters-ecommerce-fair-markets> accessed 6 December 2021.
Anirban Sen, ‘Amazon Trebles Choice of Offerings under Private Labels’ Livemint (10
October 2018) <https://www.livemint.com/Companies/O8Wc537U13T2iREYW1jYfM/
Amazon-trebles-choice-of-offerings-under-private-labels.html> accessed 6 December
2021; Digbijay Mishra, ‘Amazon Scales up Accelerator for Private Labels’ The Economic
Times (13 November 2019) <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/internet/amazon-scales-up-accelerator-for-pvt-labels/articleshow/72031746.cms> accessed 6 December
2021; Alnoor Peermohamed, ‘Only Private Labels Listings Back to Pre-Covid Days on
Amazon’ The Economic Times (28 May 2020) <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/
small-biz/startups/newsbuzz/only-private-labels-listings-back-to-pre-covid-days-on-amazon/articleshow/76055431.cms?from=mdr> accessed 6 December 2021
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in the online retail of smartphones or electronics, Amazon might be one of
the biggest players as opposed to online fashion retail47 or grocery shopping48
where it might face fierce competition from other market players. However,
the crucial question is whether this difference in competitive dynamics of the
various product categories in which Amazon operates is ‘legally relevant.’
As noted earlier, Amazon is being investigated for entering into an
anti-competitive vertical agreement in violation of section 3(4) and is not
being investigated for abuse of dominance under section 4 of the Competition
Act. Establishing a vertical agreement does not require delineation of the relevant market or proving dominance unlike abuse of dominant position under
section 4. The Supreme Court’s decision in the Coordination Committee
case created some confusion about whether relevant market delineation was
a necessary step in a Section 3 analysis.49 This confusion however has now
been put to rest by the Supreme Court through an order pronounced in a
Miscellaneous Application referred by the CCI requesting clarification of the
ambiguous Coordination Committee holding. The Supreme Court has now
clarified that “the determination of ‘relevant market’ is not a mandatory
pre-condition for making assessment of the alleged violation under Section
3 of the Act.”50
It is now clear that section 3(4) does not require delineation of relevant
market and the constituent elements of a vertical agreement under section
3(4) are limited to the following:
(i) the existence of an agreement;
(ii) amongst enterprises at different levels or stages of the production
chain;
(iii) which causes or is likely to cause an appreciable adverse effect on
competition in India.

47
48

49

50

Lifestyle Equities (n 19) [30].
Debojyoti Ghosh & Prerna Lidhoo, ‘What’s Cooking in India’s E-grocery Market?’
(Fortune India, 15 July 2021) <https://www.fortuneindia.com/enterprise/whats-cooking-in-indias-e-grocery-market/105623> accessed 6 December 2021; ‘Amazon, Flipkart,
Others May have More Fierce Competitors Ahead After Reliance in E-commerce, Grocery’
Financial Express (23 August 2020) <https://www.financialexpress.com/industry/amazon-flipkart-walmart-and-ril-market-wars-indian-e-commerce-pond-big-enough-for-plenty-of-fish/2062742/> accessed 6 December 2021.
CCI v Coordination Committee of Artists and Technicians of W.B. Film and Television
(2017) 5 SCC 17 (India).
CCI v Coordination Committee of Artists and Technicians of W.B. Film and Television
(2017) 5 SCC 17 (India).
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Thus, for the assessment of vertical agreement the focal point or at least
the starting point is the nature of the agreement between enterprises and
not the relevant market (if at all the relevant market were to form part of
the assessment). Had the competition investigation against Amazon been
for abuse of dominance under section 4, then the starting point for analysis would necessarily have to look at the market structure and competitive
dynamics as part of the relevant market delineation exercise. By choosing
to investigate Amazon for vertical agreement under section 3(4) rather than
for abuse of dominance under section 4, the CCI has successfully averted
the compulsion to look at competitive dynamics or market structure as the
first step of its analysis. Instead, the first step in the competition analysis
of Amazon’s conduct would look at the vertical relationship or agreement
between Amazon and preferred sellers or retailers through which Amazon
sells its private labels. More specifically, the first two elements of section 3(4)
would look at the terms of Amazon’s agreements with its preferred sellers
(for instance, exclusivity, special benefits etc.) and the stages of the production chain at which they operate (role of Amazon as producer, distributor,
inventory-manager etc.) Hence, any variance in competition dynamics or
market structure of different product categories is irrelevant for the assessment of the first two elements of section 3(4) and does not justify limiting or
defining the scope of the competition investigation along the lines of product
categories.
The variance in competitive dynamics and market structures of different product categories on Amazon could be relevant for the assessment of
the third element of section 3(4), that is, for ascertaining whether the vertical agreement(s) caused ‘appreciable adverse effect on competition’. For
instance, if Amazon’s market share in the product category of smartphones
is high then a vertical agreement in that category could have an ‘appreciable
adverse effect on competition’. Whereas in product categories such as fashion retail or grocery where Amazon’s market share might be comparatively
lesser and competition might be fierce, the effect of Amazon’s vertical agreement on competition might not be appreciable. Although Amazon’s market
share in each product category might admittedly be different, an assessment
of the third element of ‘appreciable adverse effect on competition’ examines
not just the market share but several other factors including entry barriers,
foreclosure effects etc.51 Hence, merely because Amazon’s market share in a
51

The Competition Act 2002, s 19(3):
The Commission shall, while determining whether an agreement has an appreciable
adverse effect on competition under section 3, have due regard to all or any of the following
factors, namely:
a. creation of barriers to new entrants in the market;
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particular product category is low does not necessarily mean that its vertical
agreement in that category is incapable of causing an ‘appreciable adverse
effect on competition’. For instance, even if Amazon’s market share in online
grocery retail is low, an ‘appreciable adverse effect on competition’ assessment should holistically look at other factors such as the company’s potential
to leverage its market power in other product categories and adjacent markets or its established distribution channels etc. The variance in competitive dynamics across different product categories of Amazon only becomes
relevant (if at all)52 while assessing the final element of section 3(4), namely,
‘appreciable adverse effect on competition’. If such differentiated analysis
of ‘appreciable adverse effect on competition’ for each product category is
needed, then the same can be carried out during the detailed competition
investigation undertaken by the Director General. It does not explain why
the investigation overall needs to be limited to or defined along the lines of
one or two product categories.
Another potential reason why the Indian competition regulator might be
comfortable with limiting the competition investigation to one or two product categories could be because they expect that any directions given by them
regarding one product category would have a domino effect53 and would
result in Amazon changing its practices across the board. Even legally it
could be used as a precedent to initiate cases against Amazon in other product categories and demand it to change its behaviour. However, such a process would not only be time-consuming but also uncertain and potentially
ineffectual. Without a doubt, Amazon would argue (as it did in Lifestyle
Equities) that the precedent would not directly and squarely apply across all
product categories due to differences in competitive dynamics and market
structure of each category. Therefore, it is unlikely that a direction given in
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
52

53

driving existing competitors out of the market;
foreclosure of competition by hindering entry into the market;
accrual of benefits to consumers;
improvements in production or distribution of goods or provision of services; or
promotion of technical, scientific and economic development by means of production
or distribution of goods or provision of services.
It might not be relevant if for instance, the CCI decides to look at ‘appreciable adverse effect
on competition’ at the aggregate level, that is, aggregated across all product categories.
For instance, the European Commission’s decision in the Google comparison shopping
case was considered to form a precedent which would provide the framework to consider
the legality of Google’s conduct vis-à-vis its other verticals. cf ‘Antitrust: Commission Fines
Google €2.42 Billion for Abusing Dominance as Search Engine by Giving Illegal Advantage
to Own Comparison Shopping Service’ (European Commission, 27 June 2017) <https://
ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_17_1784> accessed 6 December 2021;
Natasha Lomas, ‘Google Fined $2.7bn for EU Antitrust Violations over Shopping Searches’
(TechCrunch, 27 June 2017) <https://techcrunch.com/2017/06/27/google-fined-e2-42bnfor-eu-antitrust-violations-over-shopping-searches/> accessed 6 December 2021.
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one product category would have a domino effect and influence Amazon to
change its behaviour voluntarily across all categories. As evidence, the CCI’s
Market Study on E-Commerce already prescribes that e-commerce platforms
observe platform neutrality, 54 but as revealed by subsequent reports and
studies (discussed above) this prescription might not have had the desired
prohibitory and self-regulatory effect. It is unclear why an order of the CCI
pertaining to one specific product category would have the desired domino
effect when the CCI’s Market Study could not achieve the same especially if
Amazon feels that it has a chance to be able to distinguish the cases on the
basis of different market structures and competitive dynamics.
In line with the spirit of section 3(4), the competition investigation against
Amazon should focus on the vertical agreement or relationship between
Amazon and its preferred sellers or sellers through which it sells private
labels more generally rather than being limited by narrow product categories. Further, the boundaries of these product categories are hardly clear or
fixed. Each category could arguably be broken down into further sub-categories and the competitive dynamics in each of them might be different.
For instance, household appliances could be broken down into sub-groups
of electrical appliances, kitchen appliances, bathroom supplies etc.55 and
conceivably, the competitive dynamics in each of these sub-groups might be
different. Thus, by attempting to look at the competition in each product
category separately the competition regulator might be setting themselves
up for not just an arduous but maybe even an impossible task. In any event,
since section 3(4) is based on the agreement between enterprises rather than
the products in question, basing the competition investigation on product
categories seems redundant and inessential as per statutory requirements.
Thus, the scope of the competition investigation against Amazon should be
broadened.
This would also be in consonance with the investigations being carried
out in other jurisdictions such as the European Union and the USA, which
are looking at Amazon’s practices on its e-commerce platform more broadly,
not constrained by specific product categories. The European Commission
has opened two antitrust investigations against Amazon. The first looks
specifically at Amazon’s use of non-public data from independent retailers
who sell on its marketplace and whether such data is being used to favour

54

55

Market Study on E-Commerce in India (Competition Commission of India, 8 January
2020) <https://www.cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/whats_newdocument/Market-study-one-Commerce-in-India.pdf> accessed 6 December 2021.
Based on Amazon’s own categories and sub-categories of products at amazon.in.
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Amazon’s private labels.56 The second investigation looks into the possible
preferential treatment of Amazon’s private labels and those of marketplace
sellers that use Amazon’s logistics and delivery services.57 The two European
Commission investigations broadly pertain to Amazon’s dual role as a marketplace and a retailer on its own marketplace and any potential unfairness
which could arise as a consequence of this dual role. Similarly, in the USA,
the first antitrust suit brought against Amazon by the D.C. Attorney General
is not constrained by any specific product category.58 Hence, leading antitrust investigations into Amazon around the world have dealt with the practices of the platform more broadly rather than restricting it to or bifurcating
it along narrow product categories.
Based on the Reuters’ reports which reveal the prevalence of the allegedly
anti-competitive conduct across numerous product categories and in light of
the spirit and elements of section 3(4) as discussed above, the scope of the
competition investigation against Amazon should be expanded. It should be
based on the interactions and agreements between Amazon and preferred
sellers/ third-party sellers more broadly and should not be limited in scope to
only certain product categories. The variance in competitive dynamics and
market structures across product categories could be dealt with during the
detailed competition investigation. Procedurally too, the Director General
has the power to expand the scope of the investigation beyond what has
been raised in the information or the reference. 59 Even if the DG is unable
to exercise her discretion liberally to expand the scope of the existing investigations, the CCI could anyway initiate a broader inquiry into Amazon on
its own motion – a power which has been expressly conferred on it by the
Competition Act,60 and which has been exercised by the Commission on
numerous occasions in the past.61 Any subsequent broader inquiry initiated
56

57

58
59

60

61

‘Antitrust: Commission Opens Investigation into Possible Anti-competitive Conduct of
Amazon’ (European Commission, 17 July 2019) <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/pl/ip_19_4291> accessed 6 December 2021.
‘Antitrust: Commission Sends Statement of Objections to Amazon for the use of Nonpublic Independent Seller Data and Opens Second Investigation into its E-commerce
Business Practices’ (European Commission, 10 November 2020) <https://ec.europa.eu/
commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_2077> accessed 6 December 2021.
Laurine Feiner & Annie Palmer (n 23).
The Director General got this power pursuant to an amendment to the Competition
Commission of India (General) Regulations 2019; See Competition Commission of India,
The Competition Commission of India (General) Amendment Regulations 2020, S. No.
49 (Notified on February 6, 2020) <https://www.cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/regulation_
pdf/216024.pdf>; See also Excel Crop Care Ltd v CCI (2017) 8 SCC 47 (India), [44]-[45].
The Competition Act 2002, s 19(1) (Gives the Commission the power to inquire into any
alleged contravention on its own motion).
Most recently the CCI used this power to suo moto begin an inquiry against Facebook and
WhatsApp (In re: Updated Terms of Service and Privacy Policy for WhatsApp Users, 2021

16

THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY

Vol. 17

by the CCI could also be joined with all other similar matters.62 Thus, there
exist neither substantive legal nor procedural hurdles to expanding and reorienting the scope of the competition investigation and such expansion of
scope has been made necessary by the emergence of new information and
evidence.

V. Satisfaction

of the

Legal Test
R elief

to

Grant I nterim

In addition to expanding and reorienting the scope of the competition investigation, the information and evidence made available by journalistic reports
and studies conducted create a convincing case for the grant of interim relief
against Amazon. The CCI has the power to issue interim orders even without giving notice to the parties under section 33 of the Competition Act.
However, the Supreme Court has cautioned that interim orders should be
issued only sparingly and under compelling and exceptional circumstances.63
In accord with this direction, the CCI has rarely granted interim relief.64 The
Supreme Court in CCI v SAIL has held that in order to pass an interim order
under section 33, the CCI should record its satisfaction that:
(i) A contravention has been committed and continues to be committed
or is about to be committed. Such satisfaction should be of a higher
degree than the formation of a prima facie view under section 26(1)
of the Competition Act.
(ii) It is necessary to issue an order of restraint.
(iii) There is every likelihood of irreparable and irretrievable damage or
there is definite apprehension that it would have an adverse effect on
competition in the market.65
In the light of employee testimonials and the unearthing of internal documents through journalistic reports,66 this paper attempts to show that the
62

63
64

65
66

SCC OnLine CCI 19).
The Competition Commission of India (General) Regulations 2009, Regulation 27 (Power
of Commission to join multiple information).
CCI v SAIL (2010) 10 SCC 744, [119] (“Steel Authority of India”).
Nuziveedu Seeds Ltd v Mahyco Monsanto Biotech (India) Ltd 2016 SCC OnLine CCI
48 (India); Indian National Shipowners’ Assn v ONGC Ltd 2018 SCC OnLine CCI 48
(India); Confederation of Real Estate Developers Assn of India v Department of Town and
Country Planning, Government of Haryana, 2018 SCC OnLine CCI 6 (India); Federation
of Hotel & Restaurant Associations of India v MakeMyTrip India (P) Ltd 2021 SCC
OnLine CCI 12 (India).
Steel Authority of India Ltd (n 63) [31], [119].
See (n 32- 36).
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Steel Authority of India Ltd. test for granting interim relief stands satisfied.
Reuters claims that it has thousands of internal documents in its possession
which include drafts of meeting notes, PowerPoint slides, business reports
and emails. The contents of these as extracted in the Reuters reports seem
to pertain directly to Amazon’s alleged anti-competitive conduct in India.
The Commission has the same powers as are vested in a civil court under
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 including summoning and examining any
person, requiring the discovery and production of documents, receiving evidence on affidavit etc.67 Thus, the Commission should utilize these powers to inspect these documents and examine the reports and studies which
are already publicly available to ascertain whether interim relief needs to be
granted.

P roposed I nterim R elief
At the outset, it is crucial to understand the kind of interim restraint being
proposed to curb Amazon’s anti-competitive conduct before delving into its
necessity and satisfaction of the legal test under section 33 of the Competition
Act. The simplest and most straightforward relief which might come to
mind is that Amazon provides an undertaking that it would not engage in
preferential treatment of its private labels or preferred sellers, nor use internal seller data. However, such a simple prohibitory dictum to not engage
in anti-competitive conduct would be redundant. This is because Amazon
already claims that it does not preferentially treat certain products nor use
internal seller data.68 Hence, such an interim order would simply prohibit
Amazon from doing something which according to its own representations it
already doesn’t do. Further, such a simple prohibition in fact already exists.
The CCI’s Market Study on E-Commerce already recognizes ‘Platform
Neutrality’ as an area requiring self-regulation from e-commerce platforms.
The CCI Market Study report advices e-commerce platforms to maintain
platform neutrality and not engage in preferential treatment of either private
labels or preferred sellers.69 Yet neither the CCI’s directions in the Market
Study report nor Amazon’s own representations to this effect seem to have
prevented the company from engaging in such conduct as revealed through
several journalistic reports.

67

68
69

The Competition Act 2002, s 36(2); The Competition Commission of India (General)
Regulations, regs 44-45.
Lauren Feiner (n 28).
Market Study on E-Commerce in India (n 52) [86]-[89].
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Additionally, at the interim stage, it is very difficult for the regulator to
monitor and ensure that Amazon does not mete out preferential treatment
nor use internal seller data especially since the internal workings of Amazon
and its search and ranking algorithms are closely guarded secrets. Moreover,
the meaning of ‘preferential treatment’ and which practices might fall within
its ambit continues to be disputed. For instance, Amazon claims that several
of its practices such as ‘search seeding’ and ‘search sparkles’ are legitimate
practices to promote new products which do not yet have enough sales or
reviews to be effectively ranked by the search algorithm.70 A simple prohibitory interim relief of not engaging in ‘preferential treatment’ would give rise
to interpretative uncertainty, and potential redundancy and would also be
equivalent to treating the symptoms of the problem without targeting the
incentives which influence the company’s conduct.
Amazon’s dual role as the marketplace as well as the seller on the same
marketplace is the root cause of the conflict of interest which manifests itself
in the form of these anti-competitive practices. Amazon’s stake in the products sold on its e-commerce platform either through special merchants/preferred sellers or in the form of its private labels incentivizes the company to
engage in preferential treatment. The sale of private labels and products of
preferred sellers usually come with higher profit margins. The company’s
push for greater penetration of private labels in all categories encourages
a company-wide culture of pervasive use of internal seller data and preferential treatment,71 which will be impossible to deter unless this incentive
is removed. Most of the alleged anti-competitive practices including use of
non-public seller data, unfairly favouring its own products, brokering exclusive deals between preferred sellers and manufacturers etc. are traceable to
the conflict of interest which arises when Amazon plays the dual role of
marketplace and seller. Thus, the solution to the continuing anti-competitive
conduct should target this root cause of the problem by prohibiting Amazon
from operating as both the marketplace and the seller. This would entail that

70
71

Kalra & Stecklow, ‘The Imitation Game’ (n 3).
See (n 94)
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neither Amazon nor its associate companies72 nor its subsidiary companies73
directly or indirectly operate as manufacturers or sellers on its platform.
This absolute restriction prohibiting Amazon from operating in the dual
capacity of both seller and marketplace might appear harsh at first sight
especially since it seems that traditional brick-and-mortar stores,74 as well
as other e-commerce platforms75 in India, also operate their own private
labels. However, traditional business models cannot be accurately compared
to an e-commerce platform since the latter has characteristics (such as network effects and data-driven precision targeting) which are unique to or at
least exaggerated in comparison to the former.76 Network effects, use of big
data, collection of vast troves of granular data facilitating precise behavioural discrimination and targeting, ability to engage in targeted advertising and pop-up notifications (even outside Amazon’s platform) and search
bias are features which are unique to or are much more exaggerated in the
72

73

74

75

76

The Companies Act 2013, s 2(6):
“associate company”, in relation to another company, means a company in which that
other company has a significant influence, but which is not a subsidiary company of the
company having such influence and includes a joint venture company.
Explanation - For the purposes of this clause, “significant influence” means control of
at least twenty per cent. of total share capital, or of business decisions under an agreement.
The Companies Act 2013, s 2(87):
“subsidiary company” or “subsidiary”, in relation to any other company (that is to say
the holding company), means a company in which the holding company –
(i) controls the composition of the Board of Directors; or
(ii) exercises or controls more than one-half of the total share capital either at its own or
together with one or more of its subsidiary companies:
Provided that such class or classes of holding companies as may be prescribed shall not
have layers of subsidiaries beyond such numbers as may be prescribed.
Explanation – For the purposes of this clause –
(a) a company shall be deemed to be a subsidiary company of the holding company
even if the control referred to in sub-clause (i) or sub-clause (ii) is of another subsidiary company of the holding company;
(b) the composition of a company’s Board of Directors shall be deemed to be controlled
by another company if that other company by exercise of some power exercisable
by it at its discretion can appoint or remove all or a majority of the directors;
(c) the expression “company” includes any body corporate;
(d) “layer” in relation to a holding company means its subsidiary or subsidiaries;
Abhirup Roy & Aditya Kalra, ‘In India, Reliance Retail’s Private Labels Revolution Spooks
Global Consumer Goods Makers’ Reuters (22 March 2021) <https://www.reuters.com/
article/india-retail-reliance-privatelabels-idUSKBN2BE0B9> accessed 6 December 2021;
Malavika Velayanikal, ‘Happy Days for Customers as Retailers go the Private Label
Way’ Livemint (10 November 2019) <https://www.livemint.com/companies/start-ups/
happy-days-for-customers-as-retailers-go-the-private-label-way-11573392752234.html>
accessed 6 December 2021.
Suneera Tandon, ‘Private Labels to Help Drive Profitable Growth for E-commerce
Marketplaces: Report’ Livemint (26 February 2020) <https://www.livemint.com/industry/retail/pvt-labels-to-help-drive-profitable-growth-for-e-commerce-marketplaces-report-11582728645180.html> accessed 6 December 2021.
Julie Creswell (n 34).
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e-commerce model than in traditional retail stores selling private brands.
For instance, Amazon has unprecedented amounts of data to know rather
accurately consumers’ preferences, price sensitivity points etc. Such data
is used by Amazon to design its private labels, unfairly advantage them in
search ranking and follow the customer incessantly with advertisements and
pop-up notifications not just on Amazon’s own platform but perhaps even on
other websites. These characteristics are either unique to or at the very least
much more exaggerated in the e-commerce model than in traditional brickand-mortar stores. Additionally, the proposed interim relief doesn’t seek to
single out or disadvantage Amazon in comparison to other e-commerce platforms in India such as Walmart-owned Flipkart77 or Ajio,78 etc. which also
operate their own private labels. This article argues for the grant of interim
relief against Amazon based on the evidence of preferential treatment that
has emerged against Amazon79 and if evidence of preferential treatment were
to emerge against some traditional brick-and-mortar stores or even other
e-commerce platforms then similar investigations or reliefs could also be
demanded against them based on the facts of those cases.
Thus, as explained above, prohibiting Amazon from operating as a seller
on its own marketplace is the only viable non-redundant interim relief that
could be granted that addresses the competition concerns at issue. Such a
restriction would manage to address almost all of the competition concerns
ranging from the use of non-public seller data, search bias, preferential
treatment, exclusive agreements etc. by removing the incentive which leads
Amazon to engage in such conduct. The subsequent sections of this paper
discuss the manner in which this proposed relief satisfies the elements of the
Steel Authority of India Ltd. test and therefore can be granted by the CCI
under section 33 of the Competition Act.

77
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Flipkart also a range of private brands. See Vishnu Sreekumar, ‘Quality First: How
Flipkart’s Private Labels Bring Trust and Affordability to the Indian Market’ (Flipkart
Stories, 25 April 2019) <https://stories.flipkart.com/flipkart-private-brands-trust-affordability/> accessed 6 December 2021.
Ajio sells private labels such as ‘Ajio Own’. See <https://www.ajio.com/help/whoweare>
accessed 6 December 2021; Rasul Bailay, ‘Reliance Retail’s Private Labels Outpace Top
Fashion Brands Like Puma, Nike on Ajio’ The Economic Times (18 September 2021)
<https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/services/retail/ajios-private-labels-outpace-top-fashion-brands/articleshow/86304404.cms?from=mdr> accessed 6 December
2021.
See (n 32-36).
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A. Element 1: Contravention Has Been Committed and
Continues to Be Committed - Satisfaction of A ‘Higher
Than Prima Facie’ Standard of Proof.
The standard for passing an interim order under section 33 is higher than
the standard for initiating an investigation under section 26(1).80 According
to the Supreme Court, for initiating an investigation the Commission needs
to reach a “tentative view at that stage” whereas for granting interim relief
there should be “a definite expression of the satisfaction recorded by the
Commission upon due application of mind”.81 Since the CCI in Delhi Vyapar
Mahasangh has already formed a prima facie opinion that there exists a contravention, the subsequent emergence of additional internal documents and
evidence should concretize proof of contravention and meet the ‘higher than
prima facie’ standard required under section 33. Specifically, in the context
of smartphones, Reuters reported that Amazon gave preferential treatment
to its Special Merchant, Cloudtail, and helped it enter into deals with tech
companies such as Apple, Microsoft and OnePlus including exclusive deals
to sell their smartphones.82 This information is directly relevant for Delhi
Vyapar Mahasangh which pertains to the exclusive sale of smartphones and
proof of Amazon brokering such exclusive tie-ups for its special merchants
would meet the higher standard stipulated for grant of interim relief. For
other product categories too, especially textiles and categories in which
Amazon’s private labels compete, the reports’ claim to be based on substantial evidence (including internal memos and reports) of unfair preferential
treatment, manipulation of search results and use of third-party internal
data which warrant closer scrutiny and could potentially satisfy the higher
than prima facie threshold required under section 33.
In any event, as argued in the earlier section of this paper,83 the competition investigation against Amazon should be designed to look at the agreements of Amazon with third-party sellers/ preferred sellers more generally
rather than examining a few distinct product categories. Consequently, the
CCI need not look for ‘higher than prima facie’ evidence for vertical agreement in each product category separately. Instead, the CCI should examine
whether there exists evidence of vertical agreement between Amazon and its
preferred sellers more generally. The constituent elements of a vertical agreement under section 3(4), as discussed earlier, are: (i) the existence of an agreement; (ii) amongst enterprises at different levels or stages of the production
80
81
82
83

Steel Authority of India Ltd. (n 63) [31], [119].
ibid [117].
Kalra, ‘Test the Boundaries’ (n 3).
See text in Part IV titled ‘Need to Broaden the Scope of Competition Investigation’.
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chain; (iii) which causes or is likely to cause an ‘appreciable adverse effect on
competition’. For Amazon, each of these elements can be proved to a ‘higher
than prima facie’ standard. For the first two elements, the existence of at
least some of these agreements and relationships between Amazon and a
few sellers is a matter of public record and is not contested even by Amazon.
For instance, Amazon’s joint venture with Catamaran and Patni Group
which resulted in the creation of special merchants such as Cloudtail84 and
Appario85 are all matters of public record. Any doubt regarding the existence
of such agreements also stands clarified in light of subsequent evidence highlighted by Reuters’ reports.86
What could be contested by Amazon is the satisfaction of the third
element of section 3(4) - whether these agreements cause or are likely to
cause ‘appreciable adverse effect on competition’. Once again,the reports of
Reuters,87the Wall Street Journal,88 the New York Times,89 the Markup,90 the
Capitol Forum91 etc. provide substantial evidence of preferential treatment
and ‘appreciable adverse effect on competition’ attributable to Amazon’s
engagement with preferred sellers and its foray in private labels. Although
the Reuters reports are primarily the ones that concern the company’s conduct in India, even the other reports and studies conducted in the context of
84

85

86

87
88
89
90
91

Nisha Poddar, ‘Narayana Murthy to Partner with Amazon for E-commerce Business in
India’ The Economic Times (27 June 2014) <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/
ites/narayana-murthy-to-partner-with-amazon-for-e-commerce-business-in-india/articleshow/37267628.cms?from=mdr> accessed 6 December 2021; Mihir Dalal & Shrutika
Verma, ‘Amazon’s JV Cloudtail is its Biggest Seller in India’ Livemint (29 October 2015)
<https://www.livemint.com /Companies/ RjEDJkA3QyBSTsMDdaXbCN/AmazonsJV-Cloudtail-is-its-biggest-seller-in-India.html> accessed 6 December 2021; ‘Amazon,
Catamaran to End Cloudtail Joint Venture Next Year’ The Times of India (9 August 2021)
<https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/amazon-catamaran-to-endcloudtail-joint-venture-next-year/articleshow/85181383.cms> accessed 6 December 2021
(Although both companies have announced that the joint venture will be discontinued
from 2022).
Digbijay Mishra, ‘Amazon Forms JV with Patni’ The Times of India (25 September 2017)
<https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/amazon-forms-jv-withpatni/articleshow/60820854.cms> accessed 6 December 2021; ‘Amazon may not Renew
Venture with Patni Group’ The Hindu Business Line (11 November 2021) <https://www.
thehindubusinessline.com/companies/amazon-may-not-renew-venture-with-patni-group/
article37424077.ece> accessed 6 December 2021 (Although there are news that the JV
with Patni Group may also be dissolved).
Kalra, ‘Test the Boundaries’ (n 3); Aditya Kalra, ‘Amazon Deployed Secret Strategy to
Dodge India’s Regulators, Documents Show’ Reuters (17 February 2021) <https://www.
reuters.com/article/amazon-india-operation-ecommerce-idUSKBN2AH1HY> accessed 6
December 2021.
Kalra, ‘Test the Boundaries’ (n 3); Kalra & Stecklow, ‘The Imitation Game’ (n 3).
See (n 33).
See (n 34).
See (n 35).
See (n 36).

2021

AMAZON’S COMPETITION INVESTIGATION IN INDIA

23

other jurisdictions could provide useful insights and learnings into Amazon’s
core infrastructure, search algorithm or common practices.92 These reports
reveal that Amazon has access to non-public seller data (including search
data, price sensitivity data and information about previous transactions of
each customer) which allows it to target its private label products with almost
perfect precision.93 Some of this additional data that Amazon has access to
is extremely useful. For instance, some reports suggest that Amazon’s private label team has access to its database of search terms that customers
frequently use and these terms are added to descriptions of Amazon’s private
label products which boosts the ranking of the products on the search results
page.94 Similarly, it has been suggested that Amazon has access to data about
consumers’ price sensitivity points, their buying patterns and the items they
have viewed in the past- all of which are used by the company to push its
private label products on consumers. Using data which is not available to
other sellers and more egregiously using the non-public internal data of sellers, Amazon increases the conversion rates for its private labels and since
the search algorithm looks at the conversion rates of products, it succeeds
in artificially increasing the ranking of its private labels.95Although Amazon
claims that it has a company policy prohibiting employees from using internal seller data, employee testimonials reveal that in fact employees have
unfettered access to this data and its use in decision-making is pervasive to
the extent that such data was even openly discussed in company meetings.96
Other studies reveal that Amazon accords prominent placement to its private labels in comparison to competing products97 - even when these com-
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As a corollary, the Reuters report although based on Amazon’s conduct in India has been
relied upon to demand that the investigation against Amazon be expanded in the EU and
the U.S. Congress has also relied upon it to demand an explanation from the company. See
(n 43-44) and accompanying text.
‘Amazon: EC Investigation to Focus on Whether Amazon uses Data to Develop and
Favour Private Label Products; Former Employees say Data Key to Private Label Strategy’
(The Capitol Forum, 5 November 2018) <https://thecapitolforum.com/wp-content/
uploads/2018/11/Amazon-2018.11.05.pdf> accessed 6 December 2021.
Dana Mattioli, ‘How Amazon Wins: By Steamrolling Rivals and Partners’ The Wall Street
Journal (22 December 2020) <https://www.wsj.com/articles/amazon-competition-shopify-wayfair-allbirds-antitrust-11608235127> accessed 6 December 2021.
The Capitol Forum (n 91).
ibid; Dana Mattioli, ‘Amazon Scooped up Data from its Own Sellers to Launch Competing
Products’ The Wall Street Journal (23 April 2020) <https://www.wsj.com/articles/amazon-scooped-up-data-from-its-own-sellers-to-launch-competing-products-11587650015>
accessed 6 December 2021 (Based on revelations made in these reports Amazon has stated
that it has launched an internal investigation. However, nothing is known yet about the
progress or outcomes of these supposed internal investigations).
‘Amazon: By Prioritising its Own Fashion Label Brands in Product Placement on its
Increasingly Dominant Platform, Amazon Risks Antitrust Enforcement by a Trump
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peting products have higher customer ratings and more sales.98 This was
frequently achieved through ‘search seeding’ and the use of ‘search sparkles’.99Additionally, it seems that Amazon has recently optimized its search
algorithm so that instead of showing customers primarily the most relevant
and best-selling listings the site also gives a boost to items that are more
profitable for the company – a move which has been claimed to favour
Amazon’s private labels.100 Frequently private labels or products sold by its
preferred sellers are labelled as “best seller” or “Amazon’s choice” – titles
which could potentially drive up sales.101Amazon also allegedly puts several
restrictions on the advertisements that rival device manufacturers could buy
on its website.102
In the light of all the evidence and information already in the possession
of the CCI regarding Amazon’s anti-competitive conduct and subsequent
material, studies and evidence reported by various sources, the standard of
proof required for the grant of interim relief has been met. The elements of
section 3(4), namely, the existence of a vertical agreement which causes or
is likely to cause an ‘appreciable adverse effect on competition’ have been
proven to a ‘higher than prima facie’ threshold.

B. Element 2: Necessary to Issue an Order of Restraint
The second leg of the Steel Authority of India Ltd. test to grant interim relief
under section 33 involves an evaluation of the balance of convenience103 and
whether justice would be best served by passing the interim order- whether
the extant position can be restored at a later stage or the likely damages be
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99
100

101
102
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Administration’ (The Capitol Forum, 13 December 2016) <https://thecapitolforum.com/
wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Amazon-2016.12.13.pdf> accessed 6 December 2021.
Adrianne Jeffries & Leon Yin, ‘Amazon Puts its Own “Brands” First above Better-rated
Products’ (The Markup, 14 October 2021) <https://themarkup.org/amazons-advantage/2021/10/14/amazon-puts-its-own-brands-first-above-better-rated-products> accessed
6 December 2021 (the Markup study has even claimed that- “When we analyzed star ratings and number of reviews, neither could predict much better than a coin toss which
product Amazon placed first in search results”).
Kalra & Stecklow, ‘The Imitation Game’ (n 3).
Dana Mattioli, ‘Amazon Changed search algorithm in ways that boost its own products’
The Wall Street Journal (16 September 2019) <https://www.wsj.com/articles/amazonchanged-search-algorithm-in-ways-that-boost-its-own-products-11568645345> accessed
6 December 2021.
The Capitol Forum (n 95); Shane Shifflett and others (n 33).
Dana Mattioli and others, ‘Amazon Restricts How Rival Device Makers Buy Ads on its
Site’ The Wall Street Journal (22 September 2020) <https://www.wsj.com/articles/amazon-restricts-advertising-competitor-device-makers-roku-arlo-11600786638?mod=article_inline> accessed 6 December 2021; Adrianne Jeffries & Leon Yin (n 98).
Federation of Hotel & Restaurant Associations of India v MakeMyTrip India (P) Ltd 2021
SCC OnLine CCI 12 (India) [106].
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compensated.104Amazon is a multi-sided platform which services two broad
categories of ‘consumers’: (i) end-consumers who purchase products on the
platform; and (ii) sellers or retailers who utilize the platform for selling their
products and reaching the consumer. Notwithstanding the Neo-Brandeisian
critique of the ‘consumer welfare’ standard,105 even the conventional narrow notion of ‘consumer welfare’ would examine the impact of Amazon’s
conduct on both categories of consumers, that is, end-consumers as well
as retailers.106A common mistake often committed in competition assessment of Amazon’s conduct is omitting to include retailers as a category of
‘consumer’ while assessing ‘consumer welfare.’ Such inadvertent exclusion of
retailers from the category of ‘consumers’ allows Amazon to over-emphasize
the benefits that Amazon brings to end-consumers such as wide choice, discounted prices, ease of access etc. Apparent damage to retailers is excluded
from ‘consumer welfare’ assessment by painting them as ‘competitors’ rather
than ‘consumers.’ However, it must be remembered that at its core, Amazon
is a platform connecting sellers to buyers. Retailers on Amazon’s platform
are Amazon’s ‘consumers’ first and only in certain scenarios do they become
competitors which in turn creates the conflict of interest that incentivizes
Amazon to engage in anti-competitive conduct. Thus, when determining
Confederation of Real Estate Developers Assn of India v Department of Town and
Country Planning, Government of Haryana 2018 SCC OnLine CCI 6 (India) [22].
105
This presupposes that competition law is concerned with harm to ‘consumer welfare’. This
premise is now the subject of much debate and has been questioned by Neo-Brandeisian
scholars who claim that traditional notions of ‘consumer welfare’ are too narrow and that
competition law should be concerned more broadly with concentration of power or market
structure. Without expressing an opinion on whether ‘consumer welfare’ is or should be the
basis of Indian competition law assessment- this article argues that even if competition law
is narrowly concerned with ‘consumer welfare’, a consumer welfare assessment would also
need to account for the impact on retailers as they are also consumers of Amazon. For an
overview of primary Neo-Brandeisian ideas see Tim Wu, The Curse of Bigness: Antitrust in
the New Gilded Age (2018); Lina M Khan, ‘Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox’ (2016) 126 Yale
Law Journal.
106
The definition of ‘consumer’ under the Competition Act 2002 is broad and would cover
both end-consumers and retailers. See the Competition Act 2002, s 2(f):
“consumer” means any person who –
(i) buys any goods for a consideration which has been paid or promised or partly paid and
partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment and includes any user of such
goods other than the person who buys such goods for consideration paid or promised or
partly paid or partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment when such use
is made with the approval of such person, whether such purchase of goods is for resale
or for any commercial purpose or for personal use;
(ii) hires or avails of any services for a consideration which has been paid or promised or
partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment and includes
any beneficiary of such services other than the person who hires or avails of the services
for consideration paid or promised, or partly paid and partly promised, or under any
system of deferred payment, when such services are availed of with the approval of the
first-mentioned person whether such hiring or availing of services is for any commercial
purpose or for personal use.
104
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the necessity of interim relief even the conventional stringent standard of
‘consumer welfare’ would analyse the impact of Amazon’s conduct on both
categories of consumers, namely, end-consumers and retailers.

I mpact

on

E nd -Consumers

Through preferential treatment of private labels and preferred sellers,
end-consumers are denied choice and access to potentially higher-quality or
even cheaper products that are suppressed in the ranking.107 Especially when
preferentially placed products are not identified as such then their prominent
placement might run antithetical to consumers’ belief that the ranking of
products on Amazon’s results page is done on the basis of relevance or price
or quality of the product. Thus, end consumers might even be unaware of the
harm being inflicted on them. Additionally, by suppressing and eventually
excluding sellers and retailers, Amazon potentially dampens innovation and
affects choice and quality of future products for end consumers.

I mpact

on

R etailers

On the other side of the platform, Amazon’s conduct harms the sales and
profit margins of small retailers and sellers and even results in their exclusion. As its power grows and it becomes an unavoidable trading partner for
many retailers, Amazon’s ability to inflict damage on them and the severity
of such damage by preferential treatment of private brands also increase. The
gradual diminution of profits and market share as well as eventual exclusion
from the market are potentially irreversible for smaller players. Amazon creates an uneven playing field and builds entry barriers through preferential
treatment which cannot be overcome by an equally efficient or even superior
retail competitor of Amazon’s private labels. The true extent of the damage
might be impossible to calculate as some of Amazon’s brands or its association with certain retailers are unknown and even otherwise difficult to
discern.108
Thus, Amazon’s anti-competitive conduct harms consumers on both sides
of its platform.

107
108

Adrianne Jeffries & Leon Yin (n 98).
Julie Creswell (n 34).
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A mazon?

Amazon, for its part, claims that it connects small sellers to consumers
and in fact, helps consumers on both sides of the platform. It helps retailers and entrepreneurs grow their business109 and brings several benefits to
the end-consumer in the form of wider choice, discounted products, ease of
shopping (especially during the pandemic) etc.110 However, this claim obfuscates the illegality of certain selected practices of Amazon behind the overall
utility of the platform. Overall, the benefits which Amazon brings as an
e-commerce platform are conspicuous and, in that sense, Amazon’s appeal
109

110

‘Amazon enables digitization of over 1 million small businesses in India’ Business Standard
(21 December 2020) <https://www.business-standard.com/article/companies/amazon-enables-digitisation-of-over-one-million-small-businesses-in-india-120122000674_1.html>
accessed 6 December 2021; ‘Amazon Small Business Days 2021 Sees Record Sales for 84,000
SMEs’ The Economic Times (12 July 2021) <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/smallbiz/sme-sector/amazon-small-business-days-2021-sees-record-sales-for-84000-smes/helping-smes/slideshow/84336483.cms> accessed 6 December 2021; ‘Amazon India Ramps up
SMB Participation for Prime Day, Calls Ecommerce an ‘Amplifier’ for Small Businesses’
The Economic Times (20 July 2021) <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/small-biz/
sme-sector/amazon-india-ramps-up-smb-participation-for-prime-day-calls-ecommercean-amplifier-for-small-businesses/articleshow/84573900.cms> accessed 6 December 2021;
Manish Singh, ‘Amazon to Invest $1 Billion to Help Digitize Small Businesses in India’
(TechCrunch, 15 January 2020) <https://techcrunch.com/2020/01/14/amazon-to-invest1-billion-to-digitize-small-businesses-in-india/> accessed 6 December 2021; See also
‘Amazon’s Impact on Economic Growth in India’ (Amazon) <https://www.aboutamazon.
in/impact/economy/growth> accessed 6 December 2021; ‘Amazon SMB Impact Report
Highlights Success of Indian Small and Medium Businesses Despite Covid-19 (Amazon,
20 December 2020) <https://www.aboutamazon.in/news/small-business/amazon-smb-impact-report-highlights-success-of-indian-small-and-medium-businesses-despite-covid-19>
accessed 6 December 2021.
Vijay Govindrajan & Anita Warren, ‘How Amazon Adapted its Business Model to
India’ (Harvard Business Review 20 July 2016)<https://hbr.org/2016/07/how-amazonadapted-its-business-model-to-India> accessed 6 December 2021; Nidhi Singal, ‘65%
Customers Order from Tier 2 and Beyond on Amazon India, Says Amazon India V-P’
Business Today (11 October 2021) <https://www.businesstoday.in/latest/corporate/story/65-customers-order-from-tier-2-and-beyond-on-amazon-india-says-amazon-indiav-p-309065-2021-10-11> accessed 6 December 2021; Digbijay Mishra, ‘Business Back to
Normal, Non-metros Driving Growth, New Customer Addition: Amazon’s Tiwary’ The
Economic Times (9 July 2021) <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/technology/
business-back-to-normal-non-metros-driving-growth-new-customer-addition-amazons-tiwary/articleshow/84248760.cms?from=mdr> accessed 6 December 2021; See also ‘Price
Gouging has no Place in Our Stores’ (Amazon, 24 March 2020) <https://www.aboutamazon.com/news/company-news/price-gouging-has-no-place-in-our-stores>
accessed
6 December 2021; ‘How Amazon is Supporting India in Response to COVID-19’ (The
Amazon Blog, 4 May 2021) <https://blog.aboutamazon.co.uk/company-news/how-amazon-is-supporting-india-in-response-to-covid-19> accessed 6 December 2021; ‘Amazon to
Airlift, Import and Donate 100 ICU Ventilator Units from the US to Ramp up India’s
Supplies for Fighting COVID-19’ (Amazon, 27 April 2021) <https://www.aboutamazon.
in/news/company-news/amazon-to-airlift-import-and-donate-100-icu-ventilator-unitsfrom-the-us-to-ramp-up-indias-supplies-for-fighting-covid-19> accessed 6 December
2021.
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to the consumers and to retailers which has resulted in its unprecedented rise
is a testament to the utility of the platform. However, while considering the
anti-competitive nature of certain specific practices of Amazon (namely, its
vertical agreements with preferred sellers or retailers selling private labels,
preferential treatment etc.), one cannot consider the utility of the entire platform. As per this logic, there would never arise any finding of appreciable
adverse effect on competition since all products or services available in the
market are of some utility to the consumers- the question which needs to be
asked is whether the specific practices in question (such as self-preferencing
or exclusive tie-ups etc.) bring any benefits to the consumer and not whether
the overall product or service (i.e., Amazon’s online marketplace) is of utility
to the consumer. The anti-competitive impact of Amazon’s practices as a
seller must be considered in isolation and should not be confused with the
benefits which may arise when Amazon operates in a different role that of a
marketplace platform. Even the proposed interim relief is limited to curtailing only specific anti-competitive practices of Amazon without prohibiting
or affecting its operations as a marketplace platform in any way. Thus, any
benefits brought to end-consumers and retailers through Amazon’s overall marketplace platform cannot be part of the equation while judging the
anti-competitive impact of specific practices.
In addition to the potential harm done to both categories of consumers,
the need for interim relief becomes even more evident in light of the protracted and time-consuming nature of competition investigation and proceedings in India. The Commission itself has noted in the past that cases
where the inquiry is expected to take time thereby exaggerating the risk
of irreparable and irretrievable consequences are especially suited for the
passing of interim orders.111Although the competition investigation against
Amazon commenced in 2020, the investigation by the Director General itself
is still continuing and will take some time especially given the technical and
complex nature of the issues involved. Unlike some other jurisdictions, the
Indian competition regulator does not yet have the power to settle the case or
other tools (such as commitments) to avoid the protracted investigation and
litigation process. In jurisdictions such as the European Union where such
mechanisms exist, Amazon is reportedly already in talks to settle its antitrust cases.112 In India where none of these mechanisms are yet available, the
111

112

Confederation of Real Estate Developers Association of India (n 102) [23]; Nuziveedu
Seeds Ltd v Mahyco Monsanto Biotech (India) Ltd 2016 SCC OnLine CCI 48 (India) [24].
Foo Yun Chee, ‘Amazon Seeking to Settle EU Antitrust Investigations, Sources Say’
Reuters (9 November 2021) <https://www.reuters.com/business/retail-consumer/exclusive-amazon-seeking-settle-eu-antitrust-investigations-sources-say-2021-11-09/> accessed
6 December 2021.
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investigation will be followed by written and oral submissions of all parties
and multiple hearings before the Commission.113 Altogether it would take a
few years for the Commission to give its final order and several more years
for the (inevitable) appeals to be concluded.114 The extensive use of appeals
and associated delay is already on display in the case of Amazon where even
the CCI’s prima facie order initiating investigating was subjected to a string
of appeals going all the way up to the Supreme Court.115 These appeals have
already delayed the investigation. Even after the issuance of the final order
and conclusion of appeals, enforcement of the order and litigation around
enforcement could still take many more years. Too much (unquantifiable
and irreversible)116 harm might already have been inflicted on both the end
consumers and the retailers if we were to wait for the final order against
Amazon. Thus, there exists an urgent need for interim relief.

C. Element 3: Likelihood of Irreparable and
Irretrievable Damage or Definite Apprehension of
Adverse Effect on Competition
As per the third leg of the Steel Authority of India Ltd. test, while granting interim relief under section 33, the CCI would consider the balance of
convenience and look at the consequences of granting such relief on both
parties.117 Which interests if harmed can be subsequently compensated and
which interests will be irreparably harmed and hence need to be protected
through interim measures. The CCI recently in FHRAI v MMT noted that
the third element of the Steel Authority of India Ltd. test consists of two
limbs and the satisfaction of either of these two conditions is sufficient to
make a case for interim relief.118 Either there should be a likelihood of irreparable and irretrievable harm or there should be a definite apprehension of
adverse effect on competition in the market. In the case against Amazon, it is
clear as discussed above that the second limb has been satisfied and there is
113
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115
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The Competition Act 2002, s 36; The Competition Commission of India (General)
Regulations, regs 36, 20, 21, 29, 44, 45, 48.
The final order of the CCI can be appealed to the National Company Law Appellate
Tribunal and the Supreme Court. See The Competition Act 2002, ss 53B, 53T.
Amazon Seller Services (P) Ltd v CCI 2021 SCC OnLine Kar 12626, High Court of
Karnataka (India); Flipkart Internet (P) Ltd v CCI SLP (C) No. 11558 of 2021 decided on
9-8-2021, Supreme Court of India.
See Part C titled ‘Element 3: Likelihood of irreparable and irretrievable damage or definite
apprehension of adverse effect on competition’.
Nuziveedu Seeds Ltd v Mahyco Monsanto Biotech (India) Ltd 2016 SCC OnLine CCI 48
(India) [25]; Federation of Hotel & Restaurant Associations of India. MakeMyTrip India
(P) Ltd 2021 SCC OnLine CCI 12 (India) [106].
Federation of Hotel & Restaurant Associations of India v MakeMyTrip India (P) Ltd 2021
SCC OnLine CCI 12 (India) [108].
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a definite apprehension of adverse effect on competition by making the field
uneven through unfair and preferential treatment.
A case can be made that the first limb has also been satisfied as there is a
likelihood of irreparable and irretrievable damage. The CCI has previously
noted that where damage cannot be quantified in terms of money, interim
relief ought to be granted.119 In this case, it is extremely difficult to measure
the extent or quantum of damage being inflicted on end-consumers through
preferential ranking and the damage done to sellers by making the playing
field uneven. For instance, if Amazon is found to have engaged in preferential treatment of products sold by certain preferred sellers, then how does
one measure the damage done to the end-consumer as a result of such preferential treatment. Final penalty orders even if they were to prescribe behavioural changes would be unable to reverse the damage already done given the
dynamic nature of the market. Importantly, the Indian competition regime
in addition to penalizing enterprises engaging in anti-competitive conduct
also envisages compensation for the victims.120 However, computing compensation even after the issuance of the final order in such a case would be
potentially futile and would probably underestimate the extent of the damage.121 Identifying even the direct victims of Amazon’s anti-competitive conduct (end-consumers and sellers) would be almost impossible. Formulation
of acceptable damage quantification techniques and eventual disbursement
of monetary compensation to victims also seems extremely difficult if not
entirely unfeasible. For instance, even if preferential treatment by Amazon
is established, would all customers and sellers on Amazon’s platform during
that time period be eligible to be compensated and how could the damage
done to customers or sellers by repression of the more relevant results in the
ranking be calculated. All of this indicates the unquantifiable and irreparable nature of the damage that is caused by Amazon’s anti-competitive conduct which cannot be post facto adequately calculated or compensated and
must be curtailed at the earliest through the issuance of interim relief.
On the other hand, prohibiting Amazon from operating in the capacity of seller at the interim stage would not cause irreparable damage to the
enterprise. Even if the conduct in question is finally determined to not have
been anti-competitive, the underlying infrastructure, big data, supply and
119

120
121

Indian National Shipowners’ Assn v ONGC Ltd 2018 SCC OnLine CCI 48 (India),[11];
Fast Track Call Cab (P) Ltd v ANI Technologies (P) Ltd 2017 SCC OnLine CCI 36,[14].
The Competition Act 2002, s 53N.
cf as an example see the discussion around identification of affected class of consumers
and problems of quantification of damages in Mastercard Incorporated v Walter Hugh
Merricks, (2020) UKSC 51.
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distribution chains etc. which have enabled Amazon to expand its private
label business would continue to exist and could be leveraged at a later point,
making it easier for the company to re-enter as a seller. Thus, the balance of
convenience lies in favour of granting interim relief and protecting retailers
and end-consumers from irreparable and irretrievable damage.

VI. Operationalization

of

I nterim R elief

While the proposed interim relief which prohibits Amazon to act in the
capacity of a seller on its own marketplace is easy to prescribe in principle,
the exact phrasing and operationalization of this interim relief might admittedly pose some issues. For instance, Amazon could ensure that it is not
directly selling on its own platform but is doing so through other entities
whose association with Amazon is hidden behind several layers of complex
corporate structures. In fact, the foreign direct investment rules in India have
already encountered this problem on numerous occasions while attempting
to prohibit FDI in inventory-based e-commerce.122 The rules prohibiting
FDI in inventory-based e-commerce should have had the same effect as the
proposed interim relief of prohibiting Amazon from holding inventory and
operating as a seller on its platform.123 However, these FDI rules have failed
to have the desired effect and several instances have been brought to light
where e-commerce companies have devised creative corporate restructuring
techniques to bypass the FDI rules.124
To avoid a similar fate, the interim relief could be made clearer by specifying that neither Amazon nor its associate companies nor its subsidiary
companies directly or indirectly operate as sellers on its platform and by
emphasizing that the prohibition should be followed in letter and in spirit.
However, even then Amazon could dilute its investment in the sellers or
make other structural changes just to create enough wriggle room to subsequently argue that the sellers on its platform do not fall within the definition
122
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‘India Plans Foreign Investment Rule Changes that Could Hit Amazon’ Reuters (19 January
2021)
<https://www.reuters.com/world/india/exclusive-india-plans-foreign-investmentrule-changes-that-could-hit-amazon-2021-01-19/> accessed 6 December 2021; ‘Amazon
Changes Business Structure in India After New E-commerce Rules’ The Hindustan Times
(7 February 2019) <https://www.hindustantimes.com/business-news/amazon-changes-business-structure-in-india-after-new-e-commerce-rules-report/story-CxRClbBMr1kv5feZEGXh2N.html> accessed 6 December 2021.
Note that although import of the existing FDI regulations and the proposed interim relief
might be the same, the two would be in response to very different regulatory objectives.
The proposed interim relief would be in direct response to Amazon’s anti-competitive practices and in exercise of the Commission’s powers to curtail such practices.
See (n 120).
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of ‘associate company’125 or ‘subsidiary company’.126 Thus, in spite of best
efforts at precision, there is always a chance that corporate restructuring or
creative interpretation could be used to subvert the essence of the prohibition.
However, even if precise drafting of interim relief is difficult and there is a
risk of subversion of interim order in spirit through corporate restructuring,
the interim relief should nevertheless be issued. At the very least it would
compel Amazon to change its practices to avoid the most direct and obvious
infringements of the prohibition. Even otherwise, mounting regulatory pressure through the issuance of an interim order might have an important signaling effect and might influence Amazon to refrain from engaging in the use
of corporate restructuring or other techniques to subvert the essence of the
order. For instance, ongoing investigations by the Enforcement Directorate
and the CCI have already resulted in some domestic entities announcing that
they will discontinue their joint ventures with Amazon even as they assert
that these partnerships have always been ‘technically compliant’ with Indian
laws.127 Thus the threat of regulatory intervention seems to have at least some
effect on the practices of these companies. Hence, even if there exists a risk
that Amazon would try to subvert the interim order through corporate structures, the order should nevertheless be issued.

VII. Suo Moto Action Taken by the CCI
of the R euters R eport

on the basis

It is notable that the CCI recently took suo moto cognizance of the Reuters
report but ultimately decided not to pursue an inquiry purely on the basis
of the submissions made by Amazon in its affidavit.128 Primarily, Amazon
raised corporate structuring defences which obfuscated Amazon’s interests
in the sale of products carrying its own brand name. Amazon submitted an
affidavit that Amazon Seller Services Pvt. Ltd. (“ASSPL”), the entity engaged
in operating Amazon’s online marketplace in India does not directly or indirectly sell anything on its own marketplace. Instead, Amazon.com, Inc., the
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The Companies Act 2013, s 2(6).
The Companies Act 2013, s 2(87).
‘Amazon, Catamaran to End Cloudtail Joint Venture Next Year’ The Times of India (9
August 2021) <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/amazon-catamaran-to-end-cloudtail-joint-venture-next-year/articleshow/85181383.cms> accessed 6
December 2021; ‘Amazon May not Renew Venture with Patni Group’ The Hindu Business
Line (11 November 2021) <https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/companies/amazonmay-not-renew-venture-with-patni-group/article37424077.ece> accessed 6 December
2021.
Amazon India Marketplace, In re 2022 SCC OnLine CCI 19.
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parent company, has two other wholly owned subsidiaries which license the
IP of Amazon brands to third-party sellers that sell these Amazon branded
products on the online marketplace.129 This obfuscates the fact that the
biggest third-party sellers of Amazon-branded products, such as Cloudtail
and Appario are the result of Amazon’s joint ventures with domestic players. Undoubtedly, the Amazon entity entering into a joint venture to operate Cloudtail and Appario would also not be directly related to ASSPL, the
entity operating the online marketplace, but it would still be a part of the
Amazon group. For instance, it is evident from recent combination review
filings before the CCI that another wholly owned subsidiary of Amazon.
com, Inc., Amazon Asia-Pacific Resources Pvt. Ltd. owns the majority share
in Cloudtail, a major third-party seller on the Amazon marketplace (see Fig.1
below).130 Thus, it is clear that all entities, the one operating Amazon’s marketplace (ASSPL) or the one selling Amazon-branded products on the marketplace (such as Cloudtail) are directly or indirectly related to the ultimate
parent entity of the Amazon group i.e., Amazon.com, Inc. The inherent conflict of interest (discussed in Section V) doesn’t just arise when ASSPL (the
entity operating the online marketplace) itself sells Amazon-branded products. It persists even when the entities involved are legally distinct but are
still part of the same group and have unified economic goals and interests.
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ibid [5]-[7].
Acquisition of Prione Business Services Pvt. Ltd. by Amazon Asia-Pacific Resources Pvt.
Ltd., Combination Registration No. C-2021/12/893, approved on 9 March 2022 <https://
www.cci.gov.in/combination/order/details/summary/77/0>;
<https://www.cci.gov.in/
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Fig 1: An example of Amazon group companies operating in different
capacities on Amazon’s online marketplace- although the entity operating
the marketplace and the one selling Amazon-branded goods on the marketplace might be legally distinct, the linkages and connections between them
are clearly borne out.131
Quite apart from the direct or indirect stake of these group members in
each other, it is also worth examining how these group companies interact
with each other in practice. For instance, how does data collection, processing and sharing work across them. Does ASSPL share the data collected on
its online marketplace with Company 1 (from Fig. 1 above)? Merely claiming
that ASSPL does not share data with Preferred sellers (directly) is insufficient
as the same end could be achieved if the data pool of all the group companies is common or ASSPL shares data with Company 1. It is also worth
considering the overt and covert influence of the ‘Amazon’ brand in the ranking on Amazon’s marketplace. Even assuming that the entity operating the
marketplace and Preferred sellers (selling Amazon-branded products) are
not related entities, does retaining the value associated with the ‘Amazon’
brand incentivize the online marketplace to ensure that these products are
amongst the highest-ranked or top-selling products? Further, what is the
economic interest (if any) of Company 2, the Amazon group member which
acts as the licensor in ensuring that the Amazon-branded products get higher
sales, etc. These are just some of the questions which should be examined
in greater detail while looking at the interconnections between the different
Amazon group companies and their asserted distinct roles on the Amazon
marketplace.
The framework of the Competition Act is also no stranger to the idea that
group entities could operate together, have common economic goals and parent companies could exercise ‘control’ over subsidiaries. For instance, section
4 recognizes that dominance could be abused by an enterprise or a group.132
Similarly, the concept of ‘group’ plays an important role in merger review.133
In fact, in a case involving contravention of section 3 or 4, the CCI also has
the power to pass an order against other members of the group to which the
enterprise in violation belongs.134 It could even be argued that the definition
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Based on Amazon’s affidavit as outlined in the CCI’s suo moto order (n 128) and the acquisition of Prione Business Services Pvt. Ltd. by Amazon Asia-Pacific Resources Pvt. Ltd
(n130).
The Competition Act 2002, s 4(1): No enterprise or group shall abuse its dominant position.
The Competition Act 2002, s 5.
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of ‘enterprise’135 or ‘person’136 under the Competition Act is broad enough
to cover subsidiaries of the enterprise and therefore, a section 3(4) analysis could look at the group members entering into agreements more holistically and attempt to trace the connections and linkages between the parties
involved instead of simplistically noting that the legal entities are separate.
Constraints against looking at the role of group members more holistically
are neither built into the language of the statute nor is it desirable.
Using corporate structures in this manner to argue that the entity operating the online marketplace and the one that is selling Amazon-labelled
products on the marketplace (through a JV) are distinct corporate or legal
entities are age-old tactics to evade regulatory scrutiny. Amazon itself has
used such corporate restructuring as a workaround for FDI regulations.137 A
useful lesson also emerges from CCI’s recent suspension of a prior approval
that it had granted to Amazon’s acquisition of Future group’s promoter entity.138 When the CCI suspended its own prior approval of the combination,
it was criticized on the ground that the factual information about Amazon’s
control over Future’s retail arm and all associated agreements had already
been filed before the CCI and therefore, the nature and extent of Amazon’s
control over Future’s retail arm should have been apparent to the regulator.
Similar to the present case, the control of Amazon over Future’s retail arm in
that combination too was hiding in plain sight. Instead, even back then the
CCI relied purely on Amazon’s framing of the narrative and its representations, only to later claim that Amazon had engaged in ‘misrepresentation’
and ‘suppression of information’.139 The Amazon-Future Coupon combination suspension raises several interesting legal questions which are outside
the scope of this paper. However, the crucial takeaway for the present purpose is that the CCI should be more cautious in perusing the information
before it. It should try to unravel the interconnections and linkages which
are hiding in plain sight and are deliberately obfuscated by parties through
creative corporate structuring or imaginative framing of the narrative.
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See Section VI: Operationalization of interim relief.
Proceedings against Amazon.com NV Investment Holdings LLC under Sections 43A, 44
and 45 of the Competition Act 2002, order of Dec. 17, 2021 <https://www.cci.gov.in/
combination/order/details/order/1138/0>.
Amazon Future suspension order (n 138).

36

THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY

Vol. 17

The CCI order in the Amazon suo moto case also relies solely on the
affidavit submitted by Amazon.140 However, as discussed above the CCI has
wide powers and could even call for production of documents which are
in Reuters’ possession and carry out a more detailed investigation into the
working of Amazon.141 The CCI order in the suo moto case initiated on the
basis of the Reuter report does not preclude the Commission from reassessing this information. The order itself states that it is not a finding on merits
and shall not come in the way of the CCI examining the conduct of ASSPL
or any of its related entities.142 Hence, the CCI should use the Reuters report
to expand and reorient the scope of the investigation against Amazon (as
argued in Part IV) and to grant interim relief (as argued in Part V).

VIII. Conclusion
In recent times, several journalistic reports and studies have emerged which
provide substantial evidence about Amazon’s anti-competitive conduct. Such
conduct stems from Amazon’s relationship with its preferred sellers or retailers selling its private labels and appears to be pervasive across product categories. In light of this evidence, this paper has argued for two things. First,
the competition investigation against Amazon in India should be broadened and should not be limited to only certain product categories. Instead,
the investigation should focus on the interactions and vertical agreements
between Amazon and preferred sellers/ third-party retailers more broadly
and use that as the axle of the investigation. Any variance in competition
dynamics across the different product categories could be examined during
the course of the investigation. Such an expansion and reorientation of the
scope would also be in line with the spirit and elements of section 3(4) of
the Competition Act. Second, this paper has argued that the test for granting interim relief against Amazon under section 33 has been satisfied. In
order to comprehensively address all the competition concerns, the only viable non-redundant interim relief which is available against Amazon is to
prohibit it from acting in the dual capacity of marketplace and seller. The
paper has shown that necessity and balance of convenience demand that
such interim relief be granted.
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The Indian competition regulator has initiated multiple competition cases
and investigations against digital platforms.143 Inspite of CCI’s apparent
interest in digital platforms, only one of these cases has till date culminated
in a final order,144 exposing the regulator to potential averments of performative regulation. The Indian competition regulator should break away from
the mould of waiting for foreign competition regulators to take action first
and then simply follow in their footsteps. Instead, the CCI should compete
actively in the competition amongst competition regulators145 and take expeditious action on its own depending on the requirements of the domestic
market and statutory framework. For this, the CCI needs to act fast and go
beyond merely initiating investigations to taking concrete action to protect
competition in dynamic technology markets.
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Ludwig Siegele, ‘Antitrust Regulators Face Vibrant Competition- With Each Other’ (The
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